ABSTRACT This paper investigates, in a simpli…ed macro context, the joint determination of the (incorrect) perceived model and the equilibrium. I assume that the model is designed by a self-interested economist who knows the true structural model, but reports a distorted one so as to in ‡uence outcomes. This model in ‡uences both the people and the government; the latter tries to stabilize an unobserved demand shock and will make di¤erent inferences about that shock depending on the model it uses. The model's choice is constrained by a set of autocoherence conditions that state that, in equilibrium, if everybody uses the model then it must correctly predict the moments of the observables. I then study, in particular, how the models devised by the economists varies depending on whether they are "progressive" vs. "conservative".
Introduction
The formation of expectations plays a key role in our understanding of the macroeconomy. Historically, economists have moved from a naive, mechanical representation of expectations to a more sophisticated one, where rational agents optimally use their information to forecast the future.
To be able to do so, agents need to use a model, which allows them to compute the expectations of the relevant variables that they need in order to make their decisions. Typically, in the rational expectations literature, it is assumed that one uses the correct model.
In practice, though, the "correct model" is unknown, and, to the extent that it is inevitably an abstraction, the concept of "correct model" is probably meaningless. Instead, we observed di¤erent models produced by di¤erent economists. Depending on the model one is using, one will act di¤erently.
This issue has been recognized by the recent literature, which studies what happens if , instead of being in rational expectations equilibrium (REE), the economy settles at a self-con…rming equilibrium (SCE), where people use an incorrect model to formulate their policies and expectations (Essential here is Sargent (2008) ). In an SCE, the model is compatible with the available data; but if people were to deviate from their optimal policies and experiment with o¤-equilibrium paths, their beliefs would be invalidated.
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In such a world, economists have substantial in ‡uence over macroeconomic outcomes: they can manipulate them by designing their theory appropriately. This in ‡uence comes from two ingredients. First, unlike the physical world, in the economy the equilibrium outcome depends on the theory, because the theory is used by the agents to decide on their actions.
Second, the data do not allow to distinguish between alternative models, despite that these alternative models have important and contradictory policy implications.
Of course, no economist will ever concede that he or she is motivated by a political or personal agenda. Instead, they would argue that they are pursuing truth in a disinterested fashion. Yet it is not di¢ cult to …nd a correlation between an economist's personal and political background and the nature of his vision. For example, the respective visions of the working of the macroeconomy by Keynes and Hayek …t well with their political preferences.
This does not mean that the expert can say anything he wants. The models been produced must be "credible", in that their predictions …t the data. But, if the expert is in ‡uential, the data will themselves re ‡ect the fact that people use his model to make their decisions. I de…ne a model as "autocoherent" if, conditional on people using it to form expectations, it replicates the joint distribution of the observables. In other words, use of the model by all agents support a self-con…rming equilibrium (but the same model could be defeated if, say, only a fraction of the people use it. Hence it is of some use to distinguish between autocoherence, a property of the model, and self-con…rming-ness, a property of the equilibrium). A natural restriction to impose on a model is to be autocoherence. Otherwise, people will eventually abandon it. This paper investigates, in a simpli…ed macro context, the joint deter-1 King and Watson (1994) show how the same time series on in ‡ation and unemployment can be credibly interpreted in either a "keynesian" or a "monetarist" light. Friedman (1966) points out that a model is only identi…ed within a given speci…cation, and therefore that no amount of data will su¢ ce to identify the true model, as the dimension of the space of possible speci…cations is in…nite.
mination of the prevailing model and the equilibrium. I assume that the model is designed by an economist who has his own preferences and knows the true structural model. This model in ‡uences both the people and the government; while the people need to know future prices and can just use the distribution of these prices to form expectations, the government tries to stabilize an unobserved demand shock and will make di¤erent inferences about that shock depending on the model it uses. People care about output stability but also the stability of government spending. The greater the loss from government spending volatility, the more "conservative" the individual.
I then study how the models devised by the economists varies depending on whether they are "progressive" vs. "conservative".
In the present paper, there is a single expert who sets the theory (intellectual monopoly). In related work (2011b), I also study the case of intellectual competition, when several schools design di¤erent models, and each of them in ‡uences only a fraction of the population.
The predictions depend greatly on the speci…cs of the economy being considered. But in many cases, they are plausible. For example, conservative economists will tend to report a lower Keynesian multiplier, and a greater long-term in ‡ationary impact of output expansions. On then other hand, the economists'margin of maneuver is constrained by the autocoherence conditions. Here, a "progressive" economist who promotes a Keynesian multiplier larger than it really is, must, to remain consistent, also claim that demand shocks are more volatile than they really are. Otherwise, people will be disappointed by the stabilization performance of …scal policy and reject the hypothesized value of the multiplier. In some cases, autocoherence induces the experts to make, loosely speaking, ideological concessions on some parameter values. In Saint-Paul (2011c), I consider a richer example where one can show that the price to be paid for reporting a too high in ‡ationary cost of output is that one should report a too low relative variance of aggregate supply shock.
I then illustrate the analysis using the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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The idea is that di¤erent forecasters will use di¤erent models, but that these models are constrained by autocoherence conditions. For each forecaster I estimate a pseudo-model whose coe¢ cients capture the response of GDP forecasts on in ‡ation forecasts and government expenditure forecasts. A tight trade-o¤ appears among those coe¢ cients, which captures the fact that the pseudo-models must match the average growth rates of those variables. The evidence also suggests that forecasters who believe that expansions are less in ‡ationary, also tend to believe that public spending is more expansionary.
Rather than an autocoherence condition, this seems to indicate that models more favorable to expansionary policies tend to act on both margins -they downplay the in ‡ationary costs of output (i.e. they believe in a ‡at aggregate supply curve) and overemphasize the expansionary e¤ects government spending at the same time.
The paper is related to several strands of literature.
In the Political Economy literature, an important paper by Piketty (1995) considers a redistributive problem where people may form di¤erent beliefs about the e¤ort elasticity of income. Because of the feedback e¤ects of these beliefs on taxation, they are self reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. This idea has been further pursued by Bénabou and Ok (2001) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005) .
The idea of self-con…rming equilibrium was proposed by Fudenberg and Levine (1993) , who apply it to a discussion of the Lucas critique (2007), arguing that wrong policies may persist as long as no experimentation takes place to elicit the correct model, a point about identi…cation I discuss below. Sargent (2008) contains a thorough discussion of the role of incorrect perceived models and how they may have shaped policies in the past, and he provides a simple example of a policy maker who believes in a systematic trade-o¤ between expected in ‡ation and unemployment, while the actual observed trade-o¤ is entirely driven by in ‡ationary surprises. In equilibrium, the systematic component of monetary policy is held constant because that is the optimal policy, and this makes it impossible to sort out the e¤ects of 4 expected versus unexpected in ‡ation. This brings about the issue of identi…cation which is also discussed below in Sections 2.2 and 4.1. Along similar lines, Sargent et al. (2006) reverse-engineer a time series for the perceived model used by the Fed in setting its policy based on actual data and policy actions. How beliefs a¤ect policies and how they evolve is also discussed by Buera et al (2011) and Saint-Paul (2010) .
The concept of autocoherence (or self-con…rming equilibrium) is also present in the literature on learning and indeterminacy. Some sunspot equilibria may be consistent with autocoherent models that may be such that the Lucas critique does not hold (Farmer, 1991) . In the learning literature (Evans and Honkapohja, 2003) , people postulate a law of motion and gradually learn the parameters of this law of motion over time, by running least squares regressions. Asymptotically, the equilibrium can by construction be supported by an autocoherent model as de…ned by the postulated law of motion.
Finally the paper is also related to the literature on cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) . Here, however, a totally di¤erent route is taken. In the cheap talk literature, the preferences of the expert are known and any signal can be reverse engineered into the true value of the parameter. However for such reverse engineering to take place, one needs to know the relevant probability distributions in addition to the expert's preferences, that is, one needs a model. Since this model can only be obtained by an expert, some expert must be trusted. Here, the expert is trusted, and his preferences are not known. While in the cheap talk literature the expert can only send unbiased signals, here what is constraining him instead is the set of autocoherence conditions: while the signals (i.e. the models' parameters reported by the expert) can be biased, the model's predictions are not falsi…ed in equilibrium.
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2 Autocoherence and the scope for in ‡uenc-ing outcomes
The central idea of my approach is that, in order to make choices and form their expectations, people need a model, but that model may not be the correct model of the economy. I then want to develop a theory of how the model used by the people is determined and how it a¤ects the equilibrium outcome.
There exists a class of people whose job is to produce social representations.
These people are called the intellectuals. Among intellectuals, some people produce a speci…c kind of representations: the macroeconomic models that agents (households, …rms, and the government) use. This speci…c category of intellectuals are called macroeconomists.
In the model, or meta-model, developed below, it will be assumed that macroeconomists know the correct model and knowingly report another model. This is a convenient (meta) modelling choice but is to be taken as a simplifying assumption and a metaphor for the much more subtle ways in which ideological biases a¤ect the design of theories in practice. These mechanisms are indeed an important topic for further research.
Autocoherence
Intellectuals cannot force people to believe anything they want. A model which predicts that 2+2=5 will soon be discredited and abandoned. I will impose the strongest discipline on the set of models that macroeconomists may pick, by assuming that they must be autocoherent. A model is autocoherent if it satis…es the following property:
Assume all agents use that model in order to compute the probability distribution of the variables of interest to them, and then implement their corresponding optimal policy. This delivers an equilibrium, which is characterized by the joint probability distribution of the endogenous variables conditional on the exogenous variables. A subset of the variables are observable. Then, the equilibrium joint distribution of the observables is equal to 6 the one predicted by the perceived model.
This essentially means that if everybody believes in the model, then it is not defeated by the observation. This concept is akin to that of a selfcon…rming equilibrium in game theory (See Fudenberg and Levine (2003) ), but autocoherence is a property of a model in addition to that of an equilibrium. In Saint-Paul (2011a), I provide some formal de…nitions and some results. It is important to remember the following aspects:
People use the perceived model in the standard rational expectations way. That is, they assume that model is correct, that it is common knowledge, and that all agents use it to form their expectations. They do so both when using the model to form their own expectations and when deriving the predicted observable moments to confront them with the equilibrium moments.
The use of the equilibrium probability distribution of the observables, rather than a sample distribution, means that, for simplicity, the model has to be valid against any arbitrarily large number of observations.
Autocoherence restrictions would be weaker if one assumed a …nite number of observations, in which case the predicted moments would have to remain within the con…dence intervals implied by the observed sample moments.
The assumption that all agents use the same model makes sense if that is indeed the case, i.e. the economist is in a situation of intellectual monopoly. If that were not the case and if di¤erent people were using di¤erent models, then the equilibrium would depend on all the models in use. A model might be autocoherent, i.e. consistent with the equilibrium data if everybody were using it, and yet in contradiction with the data in an equilibrium where only a fraction of the population is using it. In such a case, instead of autocoherence one would impose a restriction that all models in use simultaneously predict the distribution of the observables in equilibrium. In what follows, though, I only consider the case of intellectual monopoly (intellectual competition is discussed in Saint-Paul (2011a)).
A relevant question is: Why would the government believe the economists and not treat their predictions as cheap talk? The answer is that the government has to do something and has to use some model in order to design its policy. It cannot escape the necessity of trusting an expert and using his model. It is the production of such models by a trusted expert that the present paper analyses 2 .
Autocoherence and Identi…cation
The scope for exerting intellectual in ‡uence through the choice of a model and its parameters, while meeting the constraint that the model matches the observables, clearly has to do with identi…cation. If all the parameters of the correct model are identi…ed uniquely from the moments of the observables, then this means that matching those moments reveals the correct model, and it will then typically be the case that the autocoherence constraints will force the economist to reveal the correct model. If the perceived model has the same parameters as the correct model, and only di¤ers from it, potentially, by the actual values of that parameters, then the number of equations involved in the identi…cation of the structural parameters is the same as the number of autocoherence restrictions.
If some parameters are identi…ed (in the econometric sense), then it is easy to prove that the autocoherence conditions compel the economist to reveal their true value (this is not completely straightforward because the set of identi…ed parameters is dependent on the equilibrium, while two di¤erent autocoherent models are typically associated with two di¤erent equilibria).
Under-identi…cation matters to the extent that the optimal decision rule of the agents depend on the true structural parameters of the economy, not just on the reduced form parameters. In turn, the equilibrium depends on the beliefs regarding these true structural parameters. In other words, underidenti…cation is "instrumentalized" by the intellectuals in order to manipulate outcomes.
When does the perceived model matter?
When will the expert be able to a¤ect outcomes despite the requirement that his model is autocoherent? Here we have to distinguish between three cases.
First, it may be that all the variables whose expectations matter for private decisions are observable. This means that people do not really need a structural model. All they need to know is the joint distribution between the forecasted variables and the variables in their information set when they form their expectations. One can then solve for a rational expectations equilibrium in a standard way, replacing forecasts by expectations using the actual equilibrium distribution of the variable. If this procedure yields a unique equilibrium, then the economy must be at this equilibrium. This does not mean that one could not use several alternative models. But all those models must be autocoherent, and therefore replicate the equilibrium distribution of the observables, implying that one must be at an REE. Since that REE is unique, all autocoherent models are equivalent in that they deliver the same REE. To put it another way, in such a con…guration, the conditional expectations involved in the model's equations are one of the moments of the observables. Consequently, all autocoherent models must be such that those expectations must be equal to their equivalent sample conditional average.
If this restriction is enough to yield a unique outcome, then the use of any autocoherent model can only deliver that outcome. A simple example is discussed in section 4.2.
Second, it may be that the variables that need to be forecast are observable, but that the REE is not unique. This typically arises in dynamic settings such as x t = z t + E t z t+1 where the relevant eigenvalues are such that ruling out explosive solutions is not enough to deliver a unique REE equilibrium. This case has been studied at length by the literature on indeterminacy and learning (see especially Evans and Honkapohja (2003) and Farmer (1991) ), which studies learning by postulating a perceived law of motion and looks at the stability of the actual law of motion as a function of the perceived one. Hence in this literature autocoherence is imposed in that the perceived law of motion must match the observed one, and further restrictions on stability of this mapping often rule out the sunspots (this is because the perceived law of motion leads to a backward looking formation of expectations, so that the dynamics become truly unstable if > 1). In Evans and Honkapohja (2003) , stability rules out sunspots regardless of and therefore there is no scope for an expert to coordinate the economy on a sunspot, as long as his model is reducible to a perceived law of motion in the class considered by Evans and Honkapohja, although the fundamental is also unstable if > 1 so that the theory is silent about what happens in this case. If one imposes autocoherence but not stability, the scope for picking a sunspot is larger but it depends on the class of models being considered.
If the model's speci…cation rules out the speci…c dynamics that characterize the sunspot, an autocoherent model will only yield the fundamental solution.
Another case in which multiplicity (of a very di¤erent kind) arises is when the correct model is nonlinear. It is then easy to coordinate agents on one's preferred equilibrium by picking a model with a single equilibrium, which happens to have a unique equilibrium which is the one preferred by the expert. A natural candidate for such an equilibrium is then the linearized correct model around the preferred equilibrium. Here, and contrary to the examples worked out below, the parameters of the perceived model are "locally correct", but its functional form is misspeci…ed. If the economy is locked at this equilibrium and has never visited a zone remote from it, there is a sense in which the perceived model is correct; in particular, any experiment designed to insulate a parameter would con…rm the perceived model, as long as the experiment is small and keeps the economy in the vicinity of the relevant equilibrium.
Finally, it may be that the variables of interest are not observed. Di¤er-ent models will relate them di¤erently to the observables, and thus lead to di¤erent inferences about those observables. But the models have the consistency requirements that they explain the observables. In such a case, the 'true'structural model is underidenti…ed but which structural model is used a¤ects expectations and thus the behavior of the economy. Economists can in ‡uence those outcomes by proposing alternative structural models; these alternative models are equally good in that they are all autocoherent, but, contrary to the …rst case, which model is used matters because it will change the expectations of the relevant variables. This is the case in what follows.
A simple example
I start by considering a simple example of stabilization policy. The economy is driven by the following process:
Here, y is output, g is government spending, and u and v are shocks e¤ecting output. For example, we can think of u as an aggregate demand shock. The variable z is a signal about the state of aggregate demand, which is observed prior to the government deciding on the expenditure level g: It could be some leading indicator such as a business or consumer con…dence survey, order or vacancies data, and so forth. By contrast, the shock v cannot be stabilized because no signal of v is drawn by the government prior to setting policy., We will label it a 'supply'shock to distinguish it from u:
The most relevant parameter is a; which can be labelled "the Keynesian Multiplier". As will be clear below, most ideological con ‡ict revolves around its actual value.
The shocks u , v; and " are uncorrelated and have zero mean and variances 2 u ; 2 v ; and 2 " ; respectively. To economize on notation, I will impose the following normalization
The government wants to stabilize output but su¤ers a cost for …scal activism. Its preferences are
The greater '; the more the government is "right-wing" and averse to …scal interventions.
In order to …gure out how to set g; given the value of z it observes, the government must have model which predicts, in particular, how g a¤ects y:
In most of the literature, all agents use the right model. Here I am assuming that the model used by the government may be wrong. Thus, while the true model is summarized by (a; !; In general one may want to impose plausibility limits on the perceived model parameters instead of allowing any possible value. In this model and the richer model of the next section I will impose that each coe¢ cient has the same sign as its counterpart in the actual model. This means that all these parameters must be positive (for the variances this is actually a feasibility constraint rather than a plausibility one). More generally there is a set of admissible values for the perceived model's parameters. I will refer to the inequalities that de…ne this set as the "plausibility conditions". The correct model's parameters always match those conditions. Under the correct model, the government sets a stabilization rule g(z)
which is the solution of the …rst order condition
where dy=dg = a is the correct e¤ect of government spending on output.
Furthermore
and by Bayes'law
Under the perceived model, the stabilization rule satis…eŝ
whereÊ denotes mathematical expectation computed using the perceived model, andd ŷ dg =â is the perceived e¤ect of spending on output. Here we haveÊ(y j z) =âg(z) +Ê(u j z) and therefore the optimal stabilization policy satis…es
To computeÊ(u j z); the government applies Bayes'law using the per-
It follows that the optimal stabilization rule is
Equilibrium
Given the perceived model, it is straightforward to compute the equilibrium by substituting (3) into (1)and using (2):
3.2 How is the perceived model determined?
I assume that the perceived model is produced by a school of professional economists. These economists are not disinterested but pursue their own agenda. That is, they want to design their model in such a way that the outcomes maximizes their utility function, which may be di¤erent from that of the government. Furthermore, I assume that they know the true model.
Finally, they can only come up with an autocoherent model.
The autocoherence conditions
In the present case, people observe output y and the signal z: By de…ni-tion, the autocoherence conditions mean that the joint distribution of y and z; as predicted using then perceived model, must be equal to the equilibrium one. In our Gaussian world, this reduces to matching the means and the variance-covariance matrix of y and z: It is natural to de…ne the meanmatching conditions as the "…rst order autocoherence conditions", and the variance-matching conditions as the second-order ones. Here, the …rst-order AC conditions are matched since it is common knowledge that all means are equal to zero. Hence, the autocoherence conditions state that in equilibrium, the variance-covariance matrix of (y; z) as predicted by the perceived model must be the one observed in the data. But …rst-order AC conditions will play a role in the empirical illustration below.
The actual elements of the observed variance-covariance matrix are:
But people believe that the data are generated by the perceived model; in which case these moments would be equal tô
The autocoherence conditions are
Eyz =Êyz:
Computing, it can be seen that they are equivalent tô If ' > '; the economist is more "right-wing" than the government.
Given the linear quadratic structure of the problem, the optimal policy is of the form g = z; and the policy problem amounts to picking : Given his two degrees of freedom, the economist is a quasi-dictator. That is, he can design his model so as to induce the government to select the value of that he would pick if he were setting directly. This value is clearly equal to
Comparing with (3)-(4), we see that to induce this desired policy the economist must select a model which satis…es
This is an optimality condition for the model's parameters. Thus, we have a theory which predicts which models will prevail. There are the models that satisfy the autocoherence conditions (5)- (7) along with the optimality condition (9).
Properties of the equilibrium
Since we have 4 equations with 5 unknowns, there is still one degree of freedom. But ! and of freedom is irrelevant and I will now assume that ! =! = 1; in e¤ect getting rid of parameter !: The equilibrium value ofâ can then be obtained by substituting (5) into (9) and we get
This formula implies that if the economist has the same preferences as the government, then he will reveal the true model. A similar result obtains in communication games, but we will see below that this result breaks down in richer models where the public's expectations enter the model; as in the credibility literature, one may then want to manipulate people even if everybody agrees on a common social welfare function.
We also have that the more right-wing (resp. left-wing) the economist relative to the government, the more he will understate (resp. overstate) the value of a: That is, conservative economists will produce theories where the Keynesian multiplier is low in order to deter activist policies, while leftwing ones will prefer to get a large Keynesian multiplier. The smaller the Keynesian multiplier, the more costly its is in terms of welfare to implement an activist policy (because of the aversion to public expenditure volatility in the government's preferences), and the less activist the policy. This is the reason why conservative economists have an interest in under-reporting the Keynesian multiplier, while left-wing ones want to over-report it.
However, this cannot be done independently of the rest of the theory, because the theory as a whole must match that data. The autocoherence condition (5), which can be rewritten
implies that^ 2 u > 2 u forâ > a; and conversely forâ < a: Conservative economists downplay the contribution of demand shocks to GDP, while progressive ones overstate it. Why is that so? Assumeâ < a: Then the response of government spending to the demand shock u will have a stronger e¤ect on output than what people believe. This means that government spending stabilizes output more than what people think, implying that the overall response of y to the demand shock u is weaker in reality than in the model used by the people. As such, this e¤ect leads people to overestimate the covariance between y and z relative to the data.
Similarly, output reacts more to the measurement error " than what people believe. Since output reacts negatively to "; this e¤ect also induces people to overestimate the covariance between y and z: In order to compensate for those biases, the economist's model must underestimate 2 u and accordingly overestimate 2 " : This way, the positive contribution of the demand shock to Exy is being de ‡ated, while the negative contribution of the measurement error is in ‡ated. Consequently, these additional biases tend to o¤set the biases induced by the low value ofâ and restore the consistency between the predicted and actual values of Exy:
As for matching the variance of output, it can always be done by picking the appropriate variance of the 'supply'shocks
We thus see how because of under-identi…cation, the same evidence can be interpreted di¤erently depending on the theorist's political preferences.
Discussion and extensions

Identi…cation and Policy
A key reason why the Keynesian multiplier a is not identi…ed, which opens the door to manipulation by experts, is that policy is completely colinear with the realization of the signal z: This prevents people from isolating the direct e¤ect of government spending from the e¤ect of the demand shock u: A clear solution to that would be (as pointed out in the self-con…rming equilibrium literature) to experiment by adding a random noise to the government policy, which would allow to identify the correct a by running a simple regression of output on the noise, even absent any other controls. Clearly, this experimentation is costly in terms of welfare; in fact it is precisely because 3 As long as a is not too remote fromâ; the model variance^ 2 v will remain positive. the government pursues a perceived optimal policy that identi…cation fails to hold 4 . If the government has no doubt thatâ is the correct value, it does not pay for it to experiment. On the other hand, even with a very small doubt, it could introduce an arbitrarily small noise and estimate the correct a at an arbitrarily low cost. But this is only true because is our setting the correct moments of the equilibrium distribution of observables can be observed. If the number of observations against which the perceived model must be validated is …nite, experimentation must be large enough, and take place during enough periods, in order for something to be learned: The welfare cost of experimentation becomes commensurate with the expected value of learning and it may be that one may not want to experiment ex-ante.
Manipulating the public
In the above model the only active agent is the government. As a result, the economist acts as a quasi-dictator, and would reveal the correct model if he had the same preferences as the government. In this section, I provide some additional clari…cations regarding what happens when the public uses the perceived model to form price expectations.
In the preceding example, welfare can be written as a function G( ; v; ');
where is the parameter characterizing the policy rule, v is the parameter vector associated with the correct model, and ' is the government's preferences. The policy parameter is then set optimally by using the perceived model instead of the correct one, i.e. it satis…es the …rst order condition @ @ G( ;v; ') = 0;
wherev is the perceived parameter vector. This delivers a policy rule which is a function (v; '): The economist then manipulates the government by solving 
This proves both quasi dictatorship and that the correct model is revealed
Now assume the model also a¤ects how people form their expectations.
It will then a¤ect equilibrium beyond its e¤ect on government policy. Welfare must then be rewritten as G ( The FOC is
Clearly, Equation (11) Recall that, as argued in Section 2.3, it is not enough that expectations depend on the perceived model for it to a¤ect welfare. It is also needed that autocoherence conditions leave some degrees of freedom to the expert to a¤ect those expectations, which will not happen if the signal upon which they are based and the variables that are forecasted are observable. Key to the preceding section's results is the fact that the government needs to evaluate E(u j z) and that u is not observed. Consider instead the following alternative model
In principle one could a¤ect y e by manipulating the perceived model
But since y is observable, and since this model has a unique rational expectations equilibrium, such manipulation is in fact impossible.
Performing the same steps as previously and assuming again that ! implying
The key autocoherence condition isÊyz = Eyz: We have that
The autocoherence condition is thereforê
While this does not constrain the expert to reveal the truth, it implies that all autocoherent models deliver the same rule for forming expectations,
; and all deliver the same unique REE equilibrium,
Credibility
If the government has commitment problems in setting its policy, the economist can design the model so as to indirectly provide the government with commitment. Thus, instead of the government tying its hands by delegating policy to an agent with di¤erent preferences, here credibility is achieved by a distortion of beliefs engineered by a well-intended intellectual.
To illustrate this, consider the following simple extension of our model:
We consider two alternative timings:
1. Assume expectations of public policy are set after policy is set. Then g e is always equal to g and this variation is internalized by the government when setting policy. We are in the same situation as before except that a is replaced by a + b: Consequently the government will pursue
The economist, knowing the true model, would like to pursue
and in what follows I will assume that the economist is benevolent, i.e. ' = ':
2. Expectations of public policy are frozen at the time policy is set, but based on the available signal z. The government then thinks that the impact e¤ect of an increase in g isâ; and its FOC iŝ
Since people know the policy rule and must therefore correctly anticipate g(z); we gain have g e = g: Using this we get:
Clearly, the no commitment policy will involve more activism than the commitment one if b < 0:
Despite being benevolent, if the government cannot commit the economist will not release the correct model but instead pick a model such that
The choice is again constrained by the autocoherence conditions. It is easy to check that the crucial autocoherence condition (5) is now replaced
Replacing into (12) we getâ
In the case where ' = '; we just haveâ = a+b: The economist is reporting In my setting throughout the paper, the economist are outright lying about the correct model, which they do know. However, this example suggest how in practice things might work in a more subtle way. The total keynesian multiplier a + b is conceptually dangerously close to the impact multiplier a:
The intellectual could frame his discourse so as to maintain some ambiguity about which notion of the keynesian multiplier he is talking about, so as to induce the required policy while credibly convincing himself (and his peers) that his statements are consistent with the correct model.
An empirical illustration
Fuchs et al. (1998)
Given its relevance, it is important to discuss the empirical …ndings of Fuchs et al. (1998) . These authors develop a systematic investigation of labor and public economists' policy views. They document substantial disparities in those views and they want to understand whether these di¤erence are driven by di¤erent values ("tastes") versus disagreement on the actual parameters that drive the e¤ect of policies on outcomes ("the model").
In the above model, economists have no interest in revealing their preferences (if compelled to do so, they would report the same preferences as the government, regardless of their true preferences). Therefore we would expect all policy views to be entirely driven by beliefs about parameters, while in reality they are driven by di¤erent tastes and the economists pick the parameters that suit their tastes best. 
Evidence from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
In this section, I use the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) to compare the ideas developed above with the data. As the preceding analysis makes clear, the models that will arise depend on the ideological stance of the expert as well as on the autocoherence conditions and on the correct model. We have found that the outcome is highly sensitive to the parameters of the correct model and to the set of parameters that are known. This makes it hard to come up with a tight prediction about, say, the value of a parameter.
On the other hand, the analysis tells us that we expect models to be disciplined by the autocoherence conditions and that the dispersion in predictions across experts is driven by their ideological di¤erences. The SPF is a panel of macroeconomic predictions by a large number of forecasters. It can be used in a cross section to analyze the dispersion in forecasts, and its longitudinal dimension can be used to understand how models evolve over
time. In what follows I will use those data to answer the following questions:
1. What kind of autocoherence conditions are imposed on those forecasts?
2. Can we point to a correlation between the forecasts and some measure of the forecaster's ideological position or self-interest?
3. How do the models evolve over time, under the in ‡uence of new em-pirical observations and changes in the policy regime?
The basic methodology
Each observation in the SPF is a year x quarter x individual forecasters.
The available variables include forecasts for GDP, in ‡ation, unemployment, GDP components, up to 6 quarters (short-run) and 4 years. The data set is broken down into four …les corresponding to four di¤erent time periods:
1968: 4-1979:4, 1980:1-1989:1, 1990:1-1999 The data set only contains forecasts, not the actual models used by the forecasters. Obviously, it is not possible to recover these models from the forecasts. Even if a forecaster uses a public macroeconometric model, such a model is not the actual one that generates its forecasts. Instead, it is just an input into the production of those forecasts and the actual model remains implicit. Despite these caveats, it is possible to estimate for each forecaster a pseudo-model which uncovers some regularities in the behavior of that agents. Speci…cally, for each forecaster I run the regression:
where i indexes the forecaster, t the current quarter, and y it is the 4-quarter ahead forecast of GDP growth, p it the 4-quarter ahead forecaster of (GDP de ‡ator) in ‡ation, and g it the 4-quarter ahead forecast of federal government expenditure growth. To estimate such a model we need enough observations for a given forecaster. Thus, I have only kept forecasters with at least 10 observations.
Hence the pseudo-model of forecaster i is characterized by the triplet (c 0i ; c pi ; c gi ); and this procedure applied to all forecasters generates a database of pseudo-models whose unit of observation is a forecaster. Roughly, we can interpret the variable c 0i as the "optimism" of forecaster i; while c pi and c gi capture the inverse in ‡ationary impact of output growth and the keynesian multiplier, respectively. One has to remain cautious because these are just reduced form pseudo-model coe¢ cients, but we may believe that a more left-wing forecaster will prefer to use larger values of c p and c g :
To this database are added the following control variables:
-An industry dummy (available from SPF), which denotes the industry to which the forecaster belongs. Essentially the SPF o¤ers a breakdown into two categories, namely the …nancial sector vs. all other industries. The latter category is heterogeneous and includes manufacturers, universities, forecasting …rms, pure research …rms, investment advisors, and consulting …rms.
Nevertheless it may be interesting to investigate any systematic di¤erence between the …nancial industry and the other forecasters, as the former may have speci…c preferences regarding monetary and …scal policy (for example a preference for low interest rates).
-Three variables that capture the time span over which the forecaster is active, namely the minimum, maximum, and average years for which the forecasts are available in the sample. This allows to study any systematic drift in the forecasters' views of the world, as well as to control for some potential biases. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the estimation results of the pseudomodels as well as the industry variables, while Table A2 report the year variables. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the three coe¢ cients of interest: we notice they vary a lot across forecasters. This is true for their magnitude and their sign as well. In fact, in many cases the coe¢ cients c p and c g do not have the predicted signs (negative and positive, respectively) associated with an aggregate demand curve interpretation of (14), although a plurality of estimates are indeed in this case ( 
Searching for autocoherence conditions
Ideally, given a speci…cation for the correct and pseudo model, we could derive the autocoherence conditions and check whether they are satis…ed in the data. Clearly, we are not even close to that. In particular, we do not know the dimension of the autocoherent space. If we were to uncover a relationship between pseudo-model coe¢ cients of a lower dimension than that of the autocoherent space, it would be di¢ cult to interpret because it would be driven by both the autocoherence constraints and the optimal choices of the modeller.
6 Furthermore, in the models discussed above, the variance of the unexpected disturbances enter the perceived model, and the (second order) autocoherence conditions involve those variances. But these disturbances do not appear in the forecast and in the pseudo-model coe¢ cients. Thus the proper autocoherence conditions involve variables that are not observed.
Despite this, it is relatively easy to uncover the …rst-order autocoherence conditions. They do not involve these disturbances, and simply state that the perceived model must correctly predict the means of the observables. If this is so, and if the forecasts are unbiased predictors (conditional on the perceived model), it must be that for any forecaster i the following relationship holds
where y; p and g are the sample means of the forecast variables, that are supposed to be matched. Therefore, it is possible to estimate this autocoherence condition by regression c 0i on a constant, c pi and c gi ; and the coe¢ cients can be interpreted as the average growth rate of GDP, minus the average in ‡ation rate, and minus the average growth rate of public expenditure, respectively. The results are reported on Table 3 . The …t is extremely tight, perhaps not so surprisingly. Most of the tightness of the …t derives from a strong negative relationship between c p and c g (Figure 1 ). The coe¢ cients imply average annual growth rate over the period 1990-2009 of 2.7%, 2.3%, and 2.16 % for output, prices, and federal government expenditure, respectively.
The corresponding numbers in the data, using OECD data, are 2.5%, 2.2%, and 3.1%. Thus the forecasters'implicit consensus value for the growth rate of public expenditure seems to understate reality, while it matches it well for the two other variables. in the error of variables regression was set to 0.78, which is equal to one minus the ratio between the average variance of the estimator of c p in the estimations of the pseudo models and the total variance of the variable c p :
The correlation between
Overall, this suggests that forecasters who believe in a larger Keynesian multiplier also believe in a larger (more positive, less negative) response of output to in ‡ation; under the AD interpretation of the pseudo-model, this could mean, for example, that they think the real exchange rate a¤ects output less adversely. In other words, more "left-wing" people believe in a larger Keynesian multiplier and also that activity is less sensitive to "competitiveness". The price to pay for this, in terms of autocoherence, is that they must also be more pessimistic, i.e. have a lower value of the intercept c 0 : Because both prices and government expenditures are growing over the sample, in order not to overpredict GDP growth on average given their beliefs about the e¤ects of those two variables, they must also be relatively more pessimistic about the GDP growth rates that would prevail if prices and government expenditures remained constant. Therefore, this positive correlation seems chie ‡y driven by the preferences of the forecaster, who act on both margins in order to promote their preferred level of government intervention, rather than being a feature imposed by the requirement of autocoherence.
The role of industry
I now investigate whether there might be systematic di¤erences between forecasts depending on the industry of the forecaster. A …rst pass is to tabulate descriptive statistics by industry, as is done in the following The …nancial industry appears as more "left-wing", according to Table 5, than the other industries. In accordance with the autocoherence condition, it is also more "pessimistic". How statistically signi…cant are those di¤erences?
Simple regressions of c p and c g on a dummy for the …nancial industry suggest that the di¤erence is signi…cant at the 10% level for c g ; while insigni…cant for c p : Thus, the evidence of more left-wingness of the …nancial industry is relatively mild.
Trends
Do pseudo-models evolve over time or is their distribution stationary? We can answer that question by correlating the pseudo-models coe¢ cients with the average date at which the forecaster operates. This is done by a simple regression of those coe¢ cients on the average year variable, reported in Table   6 . It should be noted from the last three columns that these results are not explained by any correlation with industry: inclusion of the industry dummy does not alter the coe¢ cients and the industry dummy keeps its signi…cance, as discussed in the preceding subsection. We see that over time, as captured by their pseudo-models, forecasters have become more "left-wing". By construction, this is due to the "extensive margin" 7 , i.e. forecasters who were more active recently tend to use a model more favorable to government aggregate intervention. This e¤ect is stronger, and more signi…cant, than the industry e¤ects.
Conclusion
This paper has hopefully provided some insights about the interaction between the ideological stance of economists and the nature of the models they will design, subject to autocoherence constraints. It has two major shortcomings, that also constitute two important directions for further research.
First, as already pointed out, the assumption that experts know the true model yet report an incorrect one on purpose is too stark. What is needed instead is a theory of how intellectuals frame their discourse (and research strategy) in a self-serving fashion, in order to produce theories they prefer, in a world where there is no hidden true model but all there is instead is the perceived model. One obvious di¢ culty is how one could …gure out the e¤ect of the perceived model on one's welfare if one ignores the correct model, but a potential solution would involve importing ideas from the robust control literature (See Hansen et al (2006) ).
Second, we need a theory of how a given model comes out to be adopted instead of an equally good model. In the work by Sargent, history depen-dence plays a key role, and his view is that the currently accepted model holds until a natural experiment brings the economy into a zone which was not previously part of the equilibrium path, which in turn reduces the scope of autocoherent models and prompts the adoption of an alternative one (See the discussion of the progressive abandonment of metallic monetary standards in Sargent (2008) ). One might believe that the new model has to be consistent with the pre-natural experiment data as well as with the new data.
In terms of the above discussion, this means that the number of autocoherence restrictions should be equal to the number of moments to be matched multiplied by the number of "regimes" over which the moments are invariants. Over time, as new regimes appear, the correct model will be identi…ed as the set of autocoherent ones will be reduced to the correct model. Unfortunately, in practice things do not happen that way, in particular because it is impossible to distinguish a regime change due to a change in the distribution of an exogenous variable (the most favorable case being when that distribution is known, as in the case of the "policy regimes" studied by the literature) from a shift in the underlying parameters of the structural model, in which case the old data must be discarded. This is why Marcet and Nicolini (2003) , for example, assume that if the prevailing model is at odds with recent observations, agents switch to a "tracking" learning mode where more weight is given to recent observations as compared to least squares learning.
If that is so, then the natural experiment need not restrict the set of autocoherent models because people eventually forget about old data. Recent observations will play a key role in the selection of the alternative model, and potentially some historical episodes (such as the Great Depression) may be more favorable to certain ideological positions (such as a taste for pervasive government involvement in the economy) than others. 
